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Islamist Buzzers: Message Flooding, Offline Outreach, and 
Astroturfing
Ario Seto
► Seto, A. (2019). Islamist buzzers: Message flooding, offline outreach, and astroturfing. Austrian Journal of 
South-East Asian Studies, 12(2), 187-208.
Based on ethnographic research on Islamist buzzers – social media political operators 
tasked with making particular online conversation subjects trend – in Indonesia, this 
article details the process of how the proliferation of insensitive message in both the online 
and offline realms plays a role in mobilizing those sympathetic to religious fundamental-
ism. As this research shows, the interviewed buzzers were one of the driving forces behind 
the massive success of the fundamentalist Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, 
FPI) as they mobilized people to participate in the organization’s political rallies between 
2016 and 2017. Driven by altruistic volunteerism and sense of community, these actors go 
beyond their duty as click-farmers. They maintain regular contact with sympathizers and 
convincing them to revive broken weblinks, hang banners on streets as part of astroturfing 
campaigns and gather masses to attend offline events. Detailing the activity and spatiality 
of buzzers in crafting new online and offline spaces as part of their innovative bottom-up 
propaganda management, this research concludes that right-wing political mobilization 
and radicalization are not simply the product of ideology but are catalyzed by technically 
and socially tedious, mediated messaging campaigns. 
Keywords: Astroturfing; Hate Speech; Islam; Right-wing Politics; Social Media Buzzer 

INTRODUCTION
In March 2018, two unrelated events provided evidence that the circula-
tion of problematic social media messages – violent and derogatory remarks, 
online radicalization, hoaxes, hate speech, defamation, bigotry, fundamen-
talist expression, and fake news among numerous other forms – is no longer 
random but has become increasingly institutionalized. In the Global North, the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, that the New York Times broke, highlighted how 
a British political consulting company was able to exploit social media users’ 
data and behavior for the benefit of Republican Party campaigns in the United 
States (Rosenberg, Confessore, & Cadwalladr, 2018). In the Global South, the 
Indonesian government cracked down on the Indonesian Muslim Cyber Army 
(MCA), a cyber-jihadist network, for its role in spreading hate speech (Lindsey, 
2018). While Cambridge Analytica exploits users’ data without their approval 
to create a specific demographic data as sources for target campaigns, MCA is 
a network of paid click-farmers who worked for a number of political figures in 
Indonesia to generate hate speech and derogatory attacks on their opponents. 
Despite their contrasting ideologies and different operational structures, both 
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nonetheless share the goal of using social media as a space to shape and manipulate 
public opinion.
At the same time, there is a problem with our current understanding of how 
such circulations ought to be countered. Take the “Christchurch Call to Action”, 
initiated by New Zealand Prime minister Jacinda Ardern and French president 
Emmanuel Macron, as an example. The call was signed by global leaders gathered 
in Paris on 15 March 2019, as a collaborative effort between governments and dig-
ital media companies to fight online radicalization (Fiegerman, 2019), two months 
after the streamed-live-on-Facebook right-wing terrorist attack on mosques in 
Christchurch, New Zealand. In response, the four tech giants Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, and Twitter pledged to implement nine steps to end “violent extremist 
content” (Microsoft Corporate Blogs, 2019), including greater online monitoring 
efforts against online posts or contents that presumably are inciting hate and bigotry. 
These strategies are neither previously unknown nor groundbreaking. At the same 
time, with the enduring rise and complexity of online-based extremism (i.e., Badawy 
& Ferrara, 2018; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2018), there is a pressing need for deeper 
studies on the entanglement between social media communication and the troubling 
developments of extremism, right-wing politics, fundamentalism, and bigotry. 
The findings described in this article therefore suggest that our observation should 
move beyond message circulation and establish a deeper knowledge of how the 
actors engaged in mediated violence generate problematic messages despite censor-
ship and, particularly, of how social media could actually animate people from online 
chats to take action in the offline realm. I argue in this paper that the Christchurch 
initiative and the use of online monitoring to tackle the widening circulation of prob-
lematic messages might not be the panacea the world is seeking, as online message 
circulation is not the sole driver of corporeal actions, since the opposing actors are 
also consolidating themselves in the offline sphere. 
Observing the mass mobilization of the Indonesian right-wing fundamental-
ist Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) rallies in 2016 and 2017, this 
research reveals that discourse mobilization is the result of the technical and publicity 
capabilities of buzzers – social media users tasked with proliferating particular online 
conversation subjects across the online scape to make them trend – who operate not 
solely online but offline as well.1 Drawing on ethnographic research, including par-
ticipant observation and in-depth interviews with eleven interlocutors2 conducted 
between February 2017 and April 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesia, this article shows that, 
through sockpuppeting and astroturfing campaigns before the rallies even began, FPI 
buzzers’ activities fostered the online and offline sociability necessary for right-wing 
political mobilization, fundamentalism, and violent actions.
Before detailing the role of buzzers as mobilization actors, the next section pro-
vides an overview of FPI’s practices to contextualize the sociability in which the 
1 The FPI is not an underground organization and is also not categorized as a radical terrorist group, but 
it is under police surveillance (interview with AA, a police officer responsible for the surveillance, 3 January 
2018). The organization advocates Sharia law in Indonesia, with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam 
citing both Wahhabi and Salafi schools. In this article, FPI actors will be referred to as Islamists, conserva-
tives, and fundamentalists.
2 The names of the interlocutors interviewed for this research have been changed to assure confidentiality.
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buzzers are operating. The third section details the altruistic operation of the buzz-
ers followed by their view of voluntarism. Taken together, the article describes how 
Islamist buzzers and their agenda-setting strategies craft communities on which they 
could then draw to garner support for their activities and organization, and how a 
fundamentalist political view with violent messaging could become publicly accepted 
in everyday life via the social media arena. 
VIOLENCE AS REGULARITY
It was not yet eight in the morning when several waves of masses were pulling toward 
the Istiqlal Jakarta Grand Mosque on Saturday, 11 February 2017, to participate in 
the fourth #aksiBelaIslam rally. As thousands of people, spanning various ages and 
genders, flooded the streets, the traffic had jammed the Senen Market district where 
I joined one of the groups, 1.8 km away from the mosque. Several other groups had 
arrived on large busses that cost around IDR 4 million (USD 280) a day, which is not 
cheap given that the 2017 provincial minimum wage in Jakarta was IDR 3,355,750 
(USD 238). Some of the busses had out-of-town license plates.
The rallies broke out after an edited video of the then-Jakarta Governor Basuki 
‘Ahok’ Tjahaja Purnama’s speech during an official visit on 27 September 2016 
went viral. In the speech, he pleaded with the audience that they should not allow 
themselves “to be misled” by his political opponents who cited verse fifty-one of 
Al-Ma’idah as the Quranic injunction for Muslims to avoid voting for a non-Mus-
lim leader for public office. The verse suggests that a non-Muslim might lack the 
competencies to administer Islam-related public affairs. Buni Yani, an independ-
ent journalist, had edited the recorded speech to create the perception that Ahok’s 
remarks were directed at the Quran, claiming that Muslims were “being fooled 
by it.”3 As the edited video went viral, many Muslims, including members of FPI, 
declared the speech religious defamation and disregarded the transcription of the 
original speech. 
Between October 2016 and May 2017, FPI managed to organize seven protest ral-
lies dubbed the “action to defend Islam” (aksi bela Islam) as a public pressure campaign 
to push the state to legally prosecute Ahok for blasphemy.4 Rally participants had 
created “#BelaIslam” (defend Islam) and “#aksiBelaIslam” (action to defend Islam) on 
Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook. They also uploaded pictures of the rallies which 
garnered national and international media coverage (Pamungkas & Octaviani, 2017).
It was a political time. The rallies took place just several weeks before the first 
round of the Jakarta gubernatorial election in February 2017. In early polls, Ahok had 
been leading his two opponents, Anies Baswedan and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono. 
Baswedan had been appointed Minister of Education in 2014 and came from a recog-
nized political family in Islamic communities. Agus Yudhoyono, the son of the sixth 
3 Basuki was found guilty of insulting Islam by the North Jakarta district court on 9 May 2017 and was 
sentenced to two years in prison, despite the state prosecutor’s recommendation of probation.
4 The seven rallies took place between 2016 and 2017 with the following dates: Aksi Bela Islam I on 14 
October 2016; Aksi Bela Islam II on 4 November 2016; Aksi Bela Islam III, 2 December 2016; Aksi Bela 
Islam IV on 11 February 2017; Aksi Bela Islam V on 21 February 2017; Aksi Bela Islam VI on 31 March 
2017; Aksi Bela Islam VII on 5 May 2017.
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Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had been an army major before 
taking early retirement.
Before the election period started, FPI had continuously objected to Ahok’s guber-
natorial leadership for, among others, three reasons. First, Ahok is a Christian of 
Indonesian-Chinese descent, and FPI leaders pushed the case that Muslims could 
only vote for a non-Muslim leader in exceptional circumstances, for instance, when 
they are the minority population (Aziza, 2017). Additionally, the Indonesian-Chinese 
ethnic group has long been stereotypically and historically accused of promoting the 
People’s Republic of China’s communist ideology (Purdey, 2005), which is considered 
to be hostile towards religion because of its preference for atheism. FPI founder and 
leader, Habib Rizieq Shihab, capitalized on this mistrust, diligently tweeting during 
the election period alleging that the Chinese ethnic group would bring Communism 
back to Indonesia (Redaksi Eramuslim, 2016b). Second, Ahok often accused FPI of 
managing local thugs and taking money from street vendors (Aisyah, 2013). Third, 
as part of the gentrification agenda, Ahok had conducted forced evictions against 
several neighborhoods of the urban poor, FPI’s strong support base (Alatas, 2016). 
Against this background, Yani’s edited viral video presented a window of opportunity 
for Shihab to commence a political campaign to legally block Ahok’s candidacy.
Persistent in advocating for Sharia law in Indonesia and scriptural in its interpre-
tation of the Quran, FPI had ascended out of distinct political circumstances in 1998 
during the power transition after the fall of the three-decade-long Suharto authori-
tarian military regime and its nationalistic doctrine (Hasan, 2006, pp. 14-16; Hasani 
& Naipospos, 2010; Wilson, 2008, 2014). In 1998, as a result of the growing severity of 
the economic crisis, students began to publicly express their objections to Suharto’s 
nepotism and his corrupt government. In May, protests-turned-riots and mass vio-
lence took place in different cities alongside increased civil aggression towards the 
military and the police in response to the shooting deaths of several activists. The 
chaos resulted in Suharto’s resignation.
Following his resignation, the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, MPR-RI) immediately 
arranged a special session (Sidang Istimewa) in order to organize a non-scheduled 
presidential election and to make the necessary political decisions to secure a func-
tioning governing state until the election. To secure the session and avoid further 
direct confrontation between the military and civilians, the military began to recruit 
civilians, including those from Islamic groups, as security volunteers organized under 
Voluntary Security Forces (Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa, Pam Swakarsa). To coun-
ter the left-leaning student protesters who demanded that all Suharto’s appointed 
politicians resign, the volunteers acted as a paramilitary group and human barricades 
during the special session between 10 and 13 November 1998 (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, 
pp. 170-173; Hasan, 2006, p. 16; Sidel, 2006, p. 139). Some proposed jihad to fight the 
student protesters who were accused of destabilizing the government (Hasan, 2006, 
p. 100; Jahroni, 2008; Sidel, 2006, p. 139).5 
With the declining popularity of Suharto’s nationalist doctrine, Pam Swakarsa 
5 See also reports from Tempo Magazine (“Berjihad Mendukung Sidang”, 1998; “Kivlan Zen Tantang 
Wiranto”, 2004).
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eventually marked the consolidation of various Islamic groups in the post-Suharto 
era and emerged as a “petri dish” for those advocating a Salafi ideology (Hasan, 2006, 
pp. 100-101). It also incubated various pious Islamic circles’ transformation into par-
amilitary groups (Schröter, 2003, pp. 39-41). Misbahul Anam and Rizieq Shihab, two 
fundamentalist Islamic leaders whose followers had participated in Pam Swakarsa 
(Hasan, 2006, pp. 14-16), founded FPI on 17 August 1998 as an organization to bring 
scriptural Islamic values to public life (Amal & Panggabean, 2004; Yunanto, 2003).
Although framing itself as a dawah6 organization, FPI is also publicly known for 
its organized and violent “sweeping operations”, in which establishments considered 
to provide lewd services, such as those involving unlicensed alcohol sales, drugs, 
prostitution, and gambling, are raided, vandalized, and their owners are intimidated 
(Lukens-Bull, 2013, p. 128; Prajuli, 2012; Rahman & Dja'far, 2009; Syaefudin, 2014). 
Shihab stated that such businesses ensure only social deviance which are the product 
of Western secularism (sekularisme), pluralism (pluralisme), and liberalism (liberalisme), 
shortened as “sepilis”. The acronym is a homophone to syphilis, which is intended to 
mock and to draw an equivalency between sexually transmitted diseases and Western 
culture and capitalism – which has been blamed as the culprit of economic crisis in 
1997 and 1998 (Gunadha & Sari, 2018). Accordingly, over the years FPI claimed that 
such vigilantism is an expected outcome of upholding the Muslim duty to promote 
good and prevent evil (amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar, commanding virtue and forbidding 
vice, see Wilson, 2008, p. 202).
In its raids and acts of vigilantism, FPI is not hesitant to incur casualties. Only 
three months after its initiation, it launched a raid against illegal gambling in the 
Ketapang area of Jakarta on 22 November 1998. The raid became an uncontrollable 
riot after rumors circulated that the Christian Ambonese ethnic-based gang, which 
had been suspected of having backed illegal gambling in the city, had launched a 
counter attack and burned down mosques (Azca, 2006; van Klinken, 2007). The riot 
ended with 14 people killed, some of whom were even burned alive (Azca, 2006), 
while 13 churches were torched (Azca, 2006; van Klinken, 2006, p. 130).
On 24 May 1999, FPI took a university student hostage for taking down its 
street banner which stated: “Alert! Zionism and Communism penetrate all aspects 
of life!” (Indarti, 2012). The banner’s location was not random since it was hung in 
front of Tarumanegara University, where many of the students are of visible Chinese 
descent.7 FPI also injured two police officers in April 2006, when it ransacked the 
Playboy Magazine office for the magazine’s pornographic contents, injured several 
participants of the National Alliance for Religious and Belief Freedom parade (Aliansi 
6 Dawah literary means “call”. It is a practice of conveying the message of Islam to non-Muslims, or call-
ing Muslims to return to the purer form of Islam practiced by Muhammad and his early followers (Hasan 
2006, pp. 32, 141).
7 As mentioned earlier, the Chinese-Indonesian ethnic group has been accused of being the ideological 
agent of the People’s Republic of China’s Communism since 1960s. In 1966, General Suharto took over 
the presidency by ousting President Sukarno and blamed the Indonesian Communist Party for economic 
crisis, political instability, and a coup attempt against Sukarno. The event was followed by a great purge 
against the communists and stigmatization of people of Chinese-descent being related to the Chinese 
government’s Communism (Purdey, 2005). Many Indonesian Muslims view their fellow Palestinian Mus-
lims as victims of the State of Israel, which occupies Palestinian land. FPI vies that both communist and 
nationalistic/Zionist movement to establish a Jewish state are the enemy of Islam.
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Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan) (Indarti, 2012), killed three 
members of the Ahmadiyya community in West Java in February 2011 (Bush, 2015, 
p. 242),8 and injured eleven police officers during a protest in October 2014 (Awaludin, 
2014). In organizing their raids, FPI often invites the masses to join, and it is difficult 
for the police to charge the organization with crimes since the perpetrators are sim-
ply members of masses sympathetic to FPI, often unidentified persons. 
The FPI maintains its organizational growth by diligently recruiting the urban 
poor and unemployed young men to its ranks (Hasan, 2006; Mudhoffir, 2017; 
Wilson, 2008, p.  202, 2010, 2014, 2015). In 2014, it claimed to have seven million 
registered members nationally (Megiza, 2014). With its growing members and sym-
pathizers (simpatisan), FPI has tapped into the informal economy by operating as a 
hoodlum organization that is suspected of having patron-client relationships with 
both politicians and corrupt police officers in the racketeering business (Petrů, 2015; 
Sidel, 2006, p. 139; Wilson, 2008, p. 202, 2015). Such claims of religious vigilantism, 
along with its political and underground business networks that employ many of the 
urban poor, and the organization’s general mass popularity (Budiman, 2017) makes 
prosecuting FPI politically treacherous as any prosecutor or investigator will appear 
to be anti-Islamic. At the same time, they would also have to answer to various polit-
ical elites (Petrů, 2015, p. 71). Accordingly, when Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was banned 
in May 2018 as part of a government crackdown on Islamist organizations, FPI was 
spared (Hariyanto, 2018).
Regardless of the dark side of FPI activities, the organization is still religiously 
meaningful for its members and sympathizers. Beyond economic and political rea-
sons, some repentant thugs actually found atonement in FPI’s activities (Bamualim, 
2011). During the #aksiBelaIslam rallies, I also observed that, contrary to the depic-
tion of FPI as an urban poor-based hoodlum organization, many participants came 
from the middle class and were not the financially precarious. The FPI’s Red Crescent 
medical team, for example, consisted of volunteer doctors and nurses.
Some FPI supporters had also organized themselves as a collective with their own 
resources, such as those involved in the FPI Women Group who had organized the 
soup kitchens for almost every single rally in the series. Tasya, a mother of three who 
works in finance and was in charge of cooking for one of the kitchens to support the 
11 February rally, explained to me that she and her friends had taken the initiative to 
raise money, collect donations, and cook for the rally participants. She alluded that 
providing meals for her fellow protesters has given her a sense of belonging to the 
Islamic community (ummah).
She had also brought her children to the rally that day to “teach them about 
Islamic values” and to stand by a leader of society (pemimpin masyarakat)  – in this 
context Shihab – who “defends Islamic values” (interview, 11 February 2017). On our 
way home from the rally, my group was stopped by an elderly couple riding a motor-
cycle who offered us spring rolls from a street food cart.9 “Please take as much as 
you like”, said the couple who ended up paying a not insignificant USD 17,60 for all 
8 FPI believes that the Ahmadiyya community is deviating from Islamic teachings (International Crisis 
Group, 2008).
9 On 11 February 2017, I joined the rally with the interlocutors’ peer group from the local mosque where 
I stayed in Jakarta.
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the rolls. Moved by the couple’s altruism, the food vendor gave us each a free cup of 
mineral water. 
In these instances, it seems unavoidable to take account of the dimension of altru-
ism and sense of community at FPI events. The possibility of having the experience of 
being in the community becomes FPI’s pull factor for the masses. It is, as the following 
section details, engineered through multi-layered activities organized by mobilizing 
actors, who at the same time continually maintain the delivery of scripturalist and 
fundamentalist Islamic messages. 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA BUZZERS
The Pancoran Barat sub-district in South Jakarta is one of the loyal bases of FPI sup-
port. The three km2 area is just a few hundred meters away from the Gatot Subroto 
economic district’s skyscrapers. On the Pasar Minggu Street side, there are two 
prominent central mosques (masjid jami):  Jami Al Munawwar Mosque and Jami 
Ikhwanul Muslimin Mosque. Both regularly host local and Middle Eastern Wahhabi 
guest preachers, although some members of the ummah also come from Salafi study 
circles.10 Both mosques regularly organize religious events, such as recitation circles 
and public sermons, with participants flooding to the street. On the west side of the 
neighborhood is Mampang Prapatan Street, and on one of its corners is the Islamic 
and Arabic College (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab/LIPIA), a Saudi spon-
sored college that has played a major role in the spread of Wahhabism in Indonesia 
and where Shihab also studied (Hasan, 2006, pp. 47-49).11
Like typical aged urban middle-class neighborhoods in Jakarta, it is filled with 
conjoining houses in the 1970s architectural style with a garage, a small garden, and 
three bedrooms. Going deeper into the neighborhood, there are alleys where smaller 
row houses are located. The alleys are around 1.5-meter-wide, cramped with parked 
motorcycles during the day. People know each other in this neighborhood. In these 
alleys, it is common to hear prayers played from YouTube and blasted from one of the 
houses’ speakers.
Outside the alleys, several street corners had been adorned with PVC banners that 
declared the community’s support for FPI. Some banners warned Muslims to only 
vote for Muslim governors. The banners varied in size. The largest banner I spotted 
was 6x4 meters, which would cost about USD 335 (IDR 4.8 million), again, an amount 
above the minimum wage in Jakarta. According to the local neighborhood watch 
(Ketua Rukun Tangga), the neighborhood youngsters (pemuda) had put the banner up. 
It was Andika, 27, who had printed the banner. He has a bachelor’s degree in 
economics from a nearby private university. He works in a human resource depart-
ment in a private electricity maintenance company and earns about USD 279 (IDR 4 
million) a month. His parents moved to this neighborhood from central Java in the 
1970s. He and his siblings went to a secular public school a few hundred meters from 
their house. He prays five times a day and has been participating regularly in the 
10 Interview with Andika, 20 April 2018. For the difference between the Wahhabi and the Salafi schools, 
particularly in  social media representation, see Ammar & Xu (2018, pp. 51-56).
11 Habib Rizieq Shihab later continued his studies at Dirasah Islamiyah Department, Tarbiyah Faculty, 
King Saud University (Hasan, 2006, pp. 15, 47). 
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neighborhood’s Quran recitation and study circle (pengajian) since he was a child. For 
the youngsters in Pancoran Barat, religiosity is part of their socialization and routine. 
They go to the mosque together and during their childhood had played soccer in its 
parking lot. For them, the mosque is also a community center.
“Well, it is a good organization, why not join it”, he answered when I asked about 
his motive for joining the FPI. When asked how he defined “good”, he pointed to how 
FPI manages to “act fast” (gerak cepat) in tackling vice and practices that are “contra-
dictory to Islamic teaching” (interview, 9 February 2017). He rejected the view that 
FPI is a vigilante group since most of the time it coordinates its raids with the police, 
something FPI has also claimed.12 He also underscored that FPI regularly ran blood 
drives and other charity events at his mosque.
“Joining” is an ambiguous term of membership in FPI. Events like rallies, organized 
public prayers, public talks, or learning circles (majlis taklim) are open to the public and 
no ID card is required. Many regular participants and FPI sympathizers at these activi-
ties are not registered. For organizational meetings, however, an ID card must be worn 
as a nametag, which also determines if a person will be allowed to enter the mosque or 
the meeting place. As a volunteer with the FPI’s Media Team, a working group under 
the FPI’s Struggle Wing (Sayap Juang), Andika has to be registered as a member.
His designated task as a member of the Media Team is to make viral FPI’s online 
posts. “Each neighborhood has somebody like me”, he claims. During the rally on 11 
February 2017, I met with six of his friends: Bahar, Candra, Dilman, Ersha, Fahrul, and 
Gege, each of whom operates in a different geographical area in Andika’s neighboring 
districts. Besides Ersha, they are young men in their twenties. Candra and Dilman 
graduated from polytechnic high schools, and the rest have bachelor’s degrees. All of 
them have permanent jobs. 
Andika and several of his friends from the Media Team are examples of “buzzers” 
who volunteer with FPI. Buzzer is the Indonesian popular term for the machinery 
of political social media influencers. The term derives from Yahoo!Messenger, a dig-
ital instant messaging client that was popular in Indonesia in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Among users, buzzing was a convention that was used to start a conversation 
by sending an emoji or graphic message to capture the attention of the person with 
whom a conversation starter wanted to chat. It is similar to a “wave” in Facebook 
messenger or a “nudge” in Microsoft Messenger.
Buzzers have two significant roles in FPI operations. First, as the name hints, they 
have to create buzz around a certain subject by making its hashtag go viral across var-
ious social media platforms. Second, buzzers are informally expected to convey the 
messages circulating in the online scape to the public in the offline realm while mobi-
lizing those sympathetic to FPI’s cause to participate in the organization’s activities.
Viral Buzzing
A social media influencer is a micro-celebrity who has a large number of media fol-
lowers through whom s/he can ensure that a certain topic of online conversation with 
12 As an illustration, the FPI Depok branch leader, Idrus Al Gadri, once stated that FPI prefers to engage 
in peaceful activity, but the law and the police department are failing in eliminating illegal alcohol trade 
and prostitution (Rahman & Dja’far, 2009, p. 3).
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a specific generated hashtag will trend. A buzzer could be a social media influencer13, 
or a sockpuppeteer. As a sockpuppeteer, the buzzer’s task is to create the perception 
that there are people in the online public space who are interested in and convinced 
of FPI’s posts or narratives. FPI leaders, such as Shihab and Anam, are the face of the 
organization with the authority to speak on behalf of the organization and to inter-
pret Islamic teaching within a certain discourse. A buzzer is the person who ensures 
their messages are being discussed by the online public. Similar to “buzz marketing” 
(Thomas, 2004), they keep FPI messaging accessible to the general public and afloat.
In the realm of social media trends, buzzers understand that a one-man-show 
would be unlikely to gain enough public attention. There are three steps to deal with 
this challenge. First, a buzzer’s facile responsibility is to “farm clicks”, that is, to give 
“heart” to FPI’s Instagram posts, to “like” them on Facebook, and to share Twitter 
comments from Shihab or other members of the organization’s leadership. Andika 
explained that one buzzer could easily operate at least four different Facebook 
accounts on one smartphone, with the first logged-in on the regular Facebook app, 
the second on Facebook Lite, and the other two on different browsers. Shihab or FPI 
would then only need 25 buzzers to get 100 likes on a post. A buzzer, in his experi-
ence, could administer at least ten accounts on the same platform.
The accumulative count of hearts, likes, or re-shares will push the post into the 
social media platforms’ top-trending lists, since Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook 
regularly suggest popular trending posts for their users to read. Without the initial 
like farming, a post will be considered by the platform’s algorithm as unattractive 
for users and will not appear among the trending topics. Accumulating hearts, likes, 
and retweets therefore acts as a hack against the platforms’ algorithms by giving the 
impression that there is a large number of users discussing or indicating interest in 
the post, even if these users might be the same person. Making the post trend, there-
fore, is the initial step for FPI leaders to buzz their message to gain public attention 
and convey their message to a larger audience. 
As it would be time consuming, buzzers actually hardly read the posts they like 
or share. They also rarely write their own posts, comments, or opinions as they take 
turns in creating memes or posting content. If they do, and this is the second regular 
task of a buzzer, it will be short just to keep the post updated with a good response 
count. One buzzer will write a certain post, while the rest of the group is tasked with 
commenting on the post to ensure that it continues to trend because of its high 
comment frequency. Similar to accumulating likes, the goal is to trick the platforms’ 
algorithm and to manipulate public perception by creating the impression that peo-
ple are actively discussing a certain hashtag on social media.
Buzzers typically have a list of comments and memes saved on their phone in case 
they need to post a comment quickly. Copying and pasting a comment is a time-saving 
practice when a buzzer needs to type a comment for ten different accounts. For exam-
ple, on one occasion during our interview, Fahrul pasted the following comment on a 
post from another fellow buzzer: “voice of the people, justice will side with Muslims 
[suara rakyat, keadilan akan memenangkan umat Islam]”. The comment then acts as 
pseudo-chat providing visual evidence or impression for others that they are not alone 
13 For example, @mas__piyuuu with his more than 60,000 Twitter followers, as of 6 November 2019.
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in reading the post and that there are other people who are agreeing with the opinion 
expressed in the post. In internet culture, such practice is known as “sock-puppeting” 
(Bu, Xia, & Wang, 2013). As such, buzzers as post commentators have been working as 
an initial pseudo-public for FPI to attract attention from other social media users. The 
role of buzzers in maintaining such regular chat flow on social media becomes signif-
icant as the FPI’s prominent leaders, because of their already demanding schedules, 
might not be able to be active in online chat themselves. Such effort is a strategy to 
keep FPI’s discourse continuously present in the public’s everyday life.
Consequently, maintaining FPI’s constant online public presence becomes the 
third online task of a buzzer; this is to ensure that FPI’s posts stay viral to enact the 
space for FPI sympathizers. Andika mentioned the term “flooding the timeline” 
(membanjiri timeline) to denote what in economic or communication studies is 
understood as viral marketing. The goal of this task is to keep any online material 
related to FPI messages available to the public while avoiding censorship or broken 
weblinks. Keeping FPI’s social media post trending and alive is a strategy to make 
FPI’s discourse constantly accessible to the public.
For example, Andika and his networks regularly posted dawah videos from Bahar 
‘Smith’ Sumayit and Abdul Somad, who are controversial Islamic preachers and FPI 
loyalists. Both are prominent FPI-affiliated preachers who travel extensively around 
Indonesia, record their speeches, sermons, and public Q&A, and upload their videos 
to YouTube. Besides actively participating in FPI raids, Smith is popularly known for 
using crass language in describing religious deviance while verbally defaming those 
whom he considers less pious as they have contrasting opinions. During a public talk 
on 17 November 2018, for example, he blatantly said that Joko Widodo, the Indonesian 
president and his political opponent, is “a traitor of the people” who “menstruates like 
a sissy” (Sutrisno, 2018). Somad is well known in the FPI circle for endorsing jihadism. 
In one of his speeches, he stated that “suicide bombers are not suicidal, but martyrs” 
(Pratama, 2018). He also stated in 2016 that “Satan dwells in every crucifix” (Paat & 
Yasmin, 2019). 
Andika explained that although Smith and Somad often deliver symbolically 
violent messages or derogatory speeches, they are popular among Muslim audience 
because of their humorous sermons, including their amusing mockery of those who 
are not in line with their values. Nevertheless, since their statements often violate 
YouTube’s or Instagram’s policies, their videos are regularly banned from these plat-
forms. To counter such censorship, Andika and his friends will upload the same video 
with different titles, at different times and occasions. “When one [online video link] 
is dead, we will already have another copy to upload”, he explained (interview, 9 
February 2017). That way, the same video will always be on the internet. 
The large circulation of such problematic religious posts is possible since Islamic 
fundamentalist buzzers such as Andika and his peers are persistent in their work. As 
a buzzer might not always be on stand-by to monitor the link, the work has to be col-
lective. “If one video goes down, one of us will upload the other. Whoever has a free 
hand has to do so. Then we will have the video streaming for another day. If that one is 
taken down, we will continue to do the same. But we have other ways [read: channels] 
too, there is WhatsApp and Telegram. Then our team could just circulate it to other 
chat groups”, Fahrul said (interview, 9 February 2017). With such intensity to maintain 
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the chat flow and content circulation, the task of being a member of FPI Media Team 
has become a labor-intensive routine. In our interviews, my interlocutors checked 
their phones regularly within minutes, an embodied habitus they could not resist.
Buzzers are diligent viral marketers. Their pseudo conversation with the public 
and their efforts to keep the related online visual material afloat could be regarded 
as classical agenda-setting strategies (see, McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014; Yang, 
Chen, Maity, & Ferrara, 2016). By keeping FPI’s posts “up trending”, they propagate 
obtrusive hate speech, social exclusion, and other problematic messages to acquaint 
the public with symbolic violence and various forms of othering.14 Mocking the oppo-
sition as “sepilis”, or “sissies”, or connoting jihadism as heroism, becomes a regular 
media content for those sympathetic to FPI’s cause. As a normalization of problem-
atic social media messages, the regular circulation incites a familiarization of the 
bigotry expressions among FPI’s audience. Studies (e.g., Archetti, 2015) on radicalism 
and fundamentalism show that the effort to counter the movement by overwriting 
the fundamentalists’ narrative is fruitless since they are loyal to their own. To coun-
ter such challenges, several studies suggest that scholars should detail the actors’ 
online and offline sociability (Ducol, 2015) and look at how such actors form com-
munity identity (Archetti, 2015; Lim, 2005) as a configuration of radicalism and 
fundamentalism. If identity and sociability are to be taken into account as dimen-
sions of radicalization or fundamentalism, then it is important to identify the actors 
who shape and manage collective identity on daily basis. In such formations, buzzers 
should no longer be viewed simply as digital mercenaries, but as actors who craft 
the community’s reference group in maintaining fundamentalist’s online sociabil-
ity by soliciting the public’s attention through their regular chats and comments. As 
operators, FPI buzzers are the guardians of the formation of fundamentalist Islamic 
associative norms which eventually make the presence of FPI in the public relevant.
When he could not have his hand on the action, Andika would ask some of his 
friends, although they are not FPI members, for help (minta tolong) to revive the 
broken link with another, live, video link. Such practice is possible because friends 
perceive that they are in a common fellowship under Islam, or simply just because 
they are friends and ought to help. Such decentralized network management, which 
relies on individual capability-based contribution and solidarity, actually echoed 
what Bennett and Segerberg (2013) denote as “connective action”. Although dealing 
with a completely different case study – Bennet and Segerberg’s actors were involved 
in pro-democratic campaigns – Andika’s network applies similar modes of operation 
through which they accomplish their “movement’s” goal by engaging with their per-
sonal networks while executing bottom-up contributions. They make sure that FPI’s 
posts and videos are always available for the online public, with the person who exe-
cutes the task not necessarily having to be a member of the organization and without 
needing direct operational guidance from the organization. As a daily operation, 
keeping the video viral does not need oversight from FPI’s Media Team.
A by-product of such collective media practice is a sense of collectivity that 
strengthens the feeling of solidarity among buzzers and their peers. The sense of col-
lectivity plays a crucial role in forming solidarity among FPI buzzers to the degree 
14 On agenda setting and obtrusiveness, see Shafi (2017).
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that they do not consider themselves to be buzzers since the term is connotatively 
related to a paid job. Instead, they view themselves simply as “persons helping around 
[bantu-bantu] to spread the information” (interview with Bahar, Andika, Gege, and 
Fahrul, 5 March 2017). Andika and his network are not members of the Muslim Cyber 
Army (MCA), a group of paid buzzers from whom they seek to distance themselves 
(interview with Bahar, Andika, Gege, and Fahrul, 5 March 2017). While justifying 
their activities as a materialization of the spiritual call, they look down on those who 
do the same for economic reasons, like those working with the MCA network. Such 
pride became very apparent after MCA members were arrested for hate speech in 
late March 2018. “They got paid. [That is why they got caught]. We do this from the 
heart [dibayar sih, kalau kita kan pakai hati]”, Fahrul commented on the arrest of MCA 
members (interview, 20 April 2018). This sense of collectivity and group solidarity has 
also encouraged buzzers to go offline as will be shown in the following section. 
Astroturfing and Banner Spatiality
The second role of FPI’s buzzers is to independently organize community outreach. 
“Most of us [the people] have handphones [read: smartphones], but sometimes they do 
not really read or people have limited internet data quotas, so we need to disseminate 
the information when we meet the person”, explained Andika about the role of buzzers 
in offline space (interview, 18 August 2017). For them, making online news go viral does 
not make offline persuasion irrelevant. Similar to Bode’s (2016) findings in the US that 
there is a discrepancy between “learning politics” from social media and actualization, 
in the FPI buzzers’ experience, news or post updates alone cannot mobilize people.
The first #aksiBelaIslam rally took place on 14 October 2016. It was symbol-
ically initiated after a Friday prayer as a religious movement. The third rally was 
even organized as a mass Friday prayer in Jakarta’s National Square on 2 December 
2016, which was later claimed by Islamic fundamentalist media outlets as the world’s 
largest Friday prayer (Redaksi Eramuslim, 2016a). Before these rallies, several khatib 
(preachers) sympathetic to FPI’s cause had urged the ummah to join the rally in their 
Friday service sermons (interview with Habib Muchsin Alatas, 17 February 2017). It 
was the buzzers’ role to persuade the preacher in their neighborhood face-to-face to 
support the rallies. When encountering a disagreement, or when the preacher refused 
to endorse FPI’s rallies, FPI buzzers would ask the preacher to simply announce the 
upcoming rally to the ummah. Rather than it being the preacher’s responsibility to 
urge people to participate, it would then become the ummah’s decision as to whether 
they would join the rally. Having the rallies on Fridays is not only symbolic, but also 
organizationally advantageous since buzzers can effectively mobilize masses which 
have already flocked in mosques. Fahrul explained, “It is not difficult [to gather 
masses], we do not even use megaphone. We simply ask them directly [face-to-face] 
after the prayer, who wants to come should go together” (interview, 5 March 2017).
The FPI buzzers interviewed for this study stated that FPI has no definite “rules” 
(aturan) or “guidance” (arahan) advising them to organize offline initiatives to gather 
people to join FPI events, but such practices were already common when they joined 
FPI (interview with Bahar, Andika, Candra, Dilman and Ersha, Fahrul, and Gege, 
5 March 2017). Fahrul recounted that the discipline as a field operator to mobilize 
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masses, or in his expression to “gather fellow Muslims”, was actually “activated” 
(mulai) through the regularities of his online chats when he invited his followers to 
join FPI events (interview, 18 August 2017).15 Before any of the events, fellow media 
officers would share information about how many people would come with them to 
the event. This information was shared initially simply for organizational reasons 
in order to calculate how many people would be in attendance. Over the course of 
time, however, the numbers became status symbols. The more people a buzzer could 
gather to participate in the event, the higher the recognition and respect s/he will 
receive from other FPI members.
Besides sharing the information about the number of expected participants, 
buzzers will also send a picture of a banner from the local neighborhood stating that 
the local neighborhood is supporting or participating in an FPI event. During the 
time of the #aksiBelaIslam rallies, banners with statements such as “We, the com-
munity of [name of the neighborhood] supports FPI and Habib Rizieq Shihab” were 
commonly found in Pancoran Barat area and its neighboring districts. Such banners 
were hardly the products of a community effort, but rather attributable to the buzz-
ers themselves. During the early years, there was indeed a coordinated effort by the 
FPI Media Team to hang banners; today, most buzzers carry out the initiatives on 
their own which includes designing, collecting donations from the local community 
to print the banner, and hanging the banner themselves.
Beyond its role as a physical artifact of the ideology, offline banners and their 
digital versions are generated representations of claims to source legitimation that 
there are public supports for FPI’s actions. For example, one of the banners Andika 
had printed states: “The steward and congregation of Jami’ Baiturrahim Mosque is 
supporting Habib Rizieq Shyihab’s [sic] struggle [Pengurus dan Jamaah Masjid Jami’ 
Mendukung Perjuangan Habib Rizieq Syihab [sic]]” (Figure 1). A sentence in smaller 
font above the line as a header says: “Defending the Ulama until we die [Bela Ulama 
Harga Mati]”.16 Thus, hanging banners is important for two reasons. First, the banner 
works internally as a sign of visual solidarity for FPI sympathizers, signifying that 
they are not alone, and that expressing sympathy for FPI activities is not an isolated 
phenomenon. As such, it creates an impression among those who are already sympa-
thetic to FPI’s cause that the organization is gaining collective support. Second, the 
banners function as public awareness campaigns, representing the continual pres-
ence of the organization and its fundamentalist discourse in the offline space. Taken 
together, since the banners are very visible on the street and pictures of them will be 
posted on FPI-related social media accounts, they become a signifier of a claim that 
seeks to influence public perception in obtrusive messaging that there is a local initi-
ative to support FPI and that there is a growing number of neighborhoods supporting 
it. Among political and communication strategists, these sets of constructed visual 
evidence and claims of mass support are known as astroturfing.
Astroturfing is an effort to manipulate public perception by fabricating visual evi-
dence, like the FPI banners or high-traffic online chats, as a signifier that there is an 
15 “Dimulainya dari situlah, kita sudah sering chat. Kan mengajak ke jalan Islam agama kita [It was started 
from that (online practices), we had already chatted regularly, and invited people to the path of Islam, our 
religion].”
16 The literal translation is “Defending Ulama costs life”.
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emerging or growing grassroots support – the product of bottom-up aspirations – 
for a certain organization, individual, cause, discourse, policy, or product, where in 
reality such support is actually minimal or non-existent. The visual sign is expected 
to attract larger public awareness to the issue. As grassroots movements frequently 
claim to represent people’s aspirations, such messaging, which hides the identity of 
the actual sponsor or organization, is more appealing to a public that could have 
directly rejected the propagation. Because such operations fake the existence of grass-
roots aspirations, the actions are referred to as “astroturfing” after AstroTurf, a brand 
of artificial grass. With its symbolic meaning of grassroots presence, taking down an 
FPI banner, therefore, is considered to be an act against the presence of the Islamic 
community. This is also why one of the FPI’s very first acts of violence, described in 
the previous section above, occurred only after one of their banners was taken down. 
Andika’s banner was raised about 800 meters away from his mosque.17 Deciding 
on the location for a banner requires careful calculation.18 Since a mosque normally 
has other banners related to its regular activities, it would be counter-productive to 
17 The banner is situated between point 3 and point 6 on Figure 2 (calculated with OpenStreeMap. GPS 
Data Source: https://osm.li/5yB).
18 Interviews with Bahar, Andika, Candra, Dilman and Ersha, Fahrul, and Gege, 11 February 2017; with 
Andika and Fahrul, 19 February and 18 August 2017; with Ersha, 19 and 20 February 2017.
Figure 1. One of Andika’s banners. (Own documentation, Jalan Mampang Prapatan XIV, 
Jakarta, 18 August 2017).
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hang FPI banner nearby. Too many banners will only result in information overload 
and confusion for the readers. Thus, the FPI banner should stand alone to attract public 
attention, but still ought to be near the mosque. A common location is public space that 
people frequently pass, such as at the nearest street corner. Buzzers will also check this 
spot from time to time to see whether a new banner has been raised near their own. If 
that was the case, the other banner would need to be taken down, since the presence of 
another banner is considered to distract the reader’s focus from the FPI banner. 
Figure 2. The location of the banners and the related mosques. (Own mapping, drawn with 
Maperitive).19
19 The map covers an area of around 2 x 1 km (calculated with OpenStreetMap).
202 | ASEAS 12(2)
Islamist Buzzers
To increase the emotional connections, banners are best positioned between two 
mosques to mark a connecting route between them. Accordingly, as virtual corridors, 
they act as “availability heuristics” (Fuller, 2004) which become constant reminders of 
the FPI’s current public engagements and the narrative it circulates on social media. 
Although these mosques might have different schools of thought, the banners denote 
the commonalities between the ummah as fellow Muslims. They create an offline 
path that forms urban street corridors (Figure 2) or a religious mental alley that leads 
the ummah from one mosque to another within FPI’s labyrinth of mosques. In short, 
the role of banners is important for the FPI not only as a signifier of public presence, 
but also to show how the masses will be physically moved and mobilized.
Displaying a banner in Indonesia is actually regulated by law.20 However, state 
monitoring is rather a form of cherry-picking as it applies only to business advertise-
ments and party-based political campaigns. While advertising banners are taxable and 
regulated provincially,21 party-based political campaign banners are regulated by the 
National Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)22. FPI banners and posters 
are neither advertising nor political campaigns and fall under the category of infor-
mational public displays of a civil society organization, which is hardly regulated.23
Visually seeing a banner seems mundane, but the unregulated display provides 
flexibility for buzzers to expand their propaganda spatiality. This was also evident dur-
ing the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial campaign, when some banners claimed that those 
who voted for Ahok would be denied an Islamic funeral (Batubara, 2017). Such banners 
conveyed messages of exclusion and acted as a form of symbolic violence in the public 
space against those who supported the democratic freedom to vote. What threatens 
democracy, then, is not the #aksiBelaIslam rallies, but the continual presence of FPI 
messages in public space that conveys violent models of religious interpretation. With 
their chats, comments, post circulations, and banners, buzzers function as a machin-
ery of violent actors while ensuring the normalization of anti-social behavior among 
the public through which a radical mind and sociability is shaped.
CONCLUSION
Recent studies suggest that there is a relationship between the rise of right-wing 
20 The main legal reference for displaying a banner in public space is the Undang-Undang Republik Indo-
nesia Nomor 40 Tahun 1999 tentang Pers (Law No.40/1999 on Press ), particularly articles 5 and 13, which 
stipulate that any commercial displays or mass communication shall refrain from offending people of dif-
ferent religions, ethnicities, and races.
21 For example, Peraturan Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta Nomor 9 Tahun 2014 tentang Penyelenggaraan 
Reklame (Provincial Regulation for the Special Capital Region of Jakarta No. 9/2014 on Billboards).
22 See Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Nomor 23 Tahun 2018 tentang Kampanye Pemilihan Umum 
(General Elections Commission Regulation No. 23/2018 concerning General Election Campaigns).
23 There is no specific regulation for civil society organization’s mass communications. The main legal 
reference to regulate the matter is the Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 2 Tahun 2017 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2013 tentang Organisasi 
Kemasyarakatan (Interim Emergency Law [literally: Government Regulation in Lieu of Statue] No.2/2017, 
Concerning the Amendment to the Law No. 17/2013 on Civil Society Organization), particularly article 
59, which states a general provision that civil organizations are forbidden from engaging in “hostile activi-
ties towards tribes, religions, races or classes”.
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politics, be it conservatism or religious fundamentalism, and identity construction 
(Lim, 2009), community (Archetti, 2015), actors’ sociability (Ducol, 2015; Huey, 
2015), patron-client relations in political economy (Mudhoffir, 2017; Petrů, 2015; 
Wilson, 2015), the operation of charismatic leadership (Gendron, 2017), and mobili-
zation through social media (Howard & Hussain, 2011; Messing & Westwood, 2014; 
Timberg, 2016). These are calls to detail the operations of right-wing and funda-
mentalist online machinery associated with how the radical mind and violence take 
shape. The continuity of FPI’s raids over the course of its twenty-year history and the 
series of #aksiBelaIslam rallies underscore how the organization has mastered mass 
mobilization and has acquired the resources necessary to manage a regular show of 
force. This paper, accordingly, details the role of buzzers as social media influencers 
who normalize anti-social behavior in the online scape and mobilize people by trans-
forming online narratives into offline spaces. This, in turn, establishes the ecology for 
FPI’s expansion.
Although FPI leaders play the role of the charismatic leaders at the center, their 
persona is crafted through continuous labor of publicity that relies on the technically 
capable buzzers as the supporting actors who also shape and mobilize the community 
of supporters. FPI buzzers are innovative in creating from-below initiatives through 
which knowledge of mass communication becomes part of the organizational cul-
ture, such as was the case with the printing of banners as astroturfing and regularly 
approach the potential ummah after Friday prayers. Detailing the technicalities of the 
presence of FPI’s online-to-offline messages, such as reviving broken weblinks to rais-
ing banners, is crucial to understanding the agency of FPI actors and their capacity to 
expand their media spatiality.
The regular activities of FPI buzzers in the everyday life also exemplify that it is 
also necessary to reconsider the popular assumption that buzzers are simply paid 
digital mercenaries in the service of a master but not a message. Beyond the scope of 
political and economic motives, operators like Andika and his fellows did not receive 
any salary from the organization and perform their duty as a collective with the con-
fidence that their actions are a representation of Islamic voices. Their personal gain 
is a spiritual one – may that be religious altruism or a secure feeling of having a stable 
Islamic community. Altruism as an experience becomes stronger since in return, as a 
result of their effort, there is an emerging presence of public support, which in their 
view justifies their actions.
Assessing such experience, they also believe that the events around the series of 
rallies took place within the norms of political communication, and that violent con-
tent and othering posts were acceptable within that frame. Telling them that their 
established practices are anti-democratic is confusing to them. In sum, rather than 
taking the path to determine whether FPI success in mass mobilization is the out-
come of ideology or politics, this paper argues that although the development of 
Islamist solidarity and political Islam among the sympathizers might be ideological, it 
most certainly emerges from technical procedures and organizational management. 
The practice is neither emotional nor impulsive; it requires discipline and integrity.
The activities of FPI buzzers as part of fundamentalist agenda setting, albeit 
from-below, detailed in this study could raise the concern of echoing the positivistic 
approach of cultivation theory (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2015) as this article 
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has not discussed the audience’s agency in decoding the messages. The ability of FPI 
buzzers in gathering new participants through strategies of publicity and persuasion 
in the offline space, however, undeniably shows such a tendency. The crucial issue 
to highlight here is to understand the technical role of buzzers as the machinery of 
violence in mundane everyday life as it precipitates mobilization and how the masses 
can be threaded together.
Consequently, the counter action to wide-spreading religious fundamentalism 
should also be organizational. Promoting secularism or the offering of a counter 
ideological narrative would be fruitless since FPI buzzers are already convinced that 
they are speaking on behalf of the greater good of all Muslims. It is then crucial for 
democratic actors to counter fundamentalism by contesting FPI’s mediated charisma 
by offering Islamic communities new charismatic leaders who promote democratic 
values using hip tropes, like Somad and Smith, while providing an equally strong 
buzzer network. Democratic discourses need more space making activists; and those 
activists need the discipline and integrity of buzzers like Andika and his networks.

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